RE: RE: Another tragic case of not reading the manual

Subject: RE: RE: Another tragic case of not reading the manual
From: "Gene Kim-Eng" <techpubs -at- genek -dot- com>
To: eric -dot- dunn -at- ca -dot- transport -dot- bombardier -dot- com, techwr-l -at- lists -dot- raycomm -dot- com
Date: 14 Aug 2003 20:40:52 GMT

Actually, the article describes the access hatch as an
"escape hatch," suggesting that the worker could have
actually been removed from the machine through it.

One bit of information that is missing yet important is
how old this machine is. One of my first jobs out of
school (as an engineer, not a writer) was designing new
safety devices and labeling systems for a decades-old
line of factory machinery. My employer had just purchased
the assets of another mfr that had shut down after some
100 years in business, and had decided that this company's
product lines needed to be redesigned and retrofitted.
The reasoning: when the equipment had originally been made,
factory workers stayed with their employers for a lifetime,
and even the least skilled jobs in the plants were learned
through long apprenticeships; but in the modern workplace,
workers were hired and laid off regularly, and often didn't
get the thorough training necessary for them to be able
to work safely with unguarded, unlabeled machines. This bit
of enlightenment came to my first employer way back in the
1960's, well before the US govt passed OSHA. Unless that
laundry system dates back to George VI, I think the mfr is
in for it. Certainly, the employer whose own plant
engineers didn't know the equipment had an "escape hatch,"

Gene Kim-Eng

------- Original Message -------
Thu, 14 Aug 2003 15:09:15 -0400 ?wrote:

In the situation described, the door has to be able to be opened while

still hot. There's no need for the laundry to cool between loads. That

would hobble production. Workers WILL have to enter the machine on

occasion as there WILL be jams. Exposure to the temperatures that killed

the worker are not lethal for in and out operations. I this case the

worker died after HOURS of exposure because rescuers could not get to him.

It seems to imply that if the access panel was opened and cool air and

water were given to the worker immediately, there would have been no loss

of life. Therefore, the problem is one of signage and procedures. Signage

clearly showing the access panels and reminding workers of correct

procedure. Correct procedures to limit the possibility of getting trapped

and procedures for rescuing someone who is.

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